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In post-Yugoslav spaces, democracy has not been won by independent and robust social groups that can act as a 
counterweight to the state structure, with formed interests that act "transformatively"; not directing political change 
and form the basis of political pluralism. In the processes of political and social transformation of society, 
pragmatism is a dangerous thing, and the apparent tendency of key political actors to follow the "speech of Europe" 
in their daily political practice without taking into the content. Ethnonationalism does not bring political scenes a 
socioeconomic system that would already be independently formed, with appropriate bearers of transformative 
interests and competing "projects" of the new order. Therefore, the worst uncertainty and fragility can slow down 
the normalization process and other unplanned consequences. The class of nationalist capitalists, political-
economic oligarchies, during the conflicts, takes control of the state apparatus and ownership of economic 
resources, constituting "nation-states"; unilateral expropriation presented as a self-legitimizing act by which the 
whole society realizes its being in the form of sovereignty and embodies itself by constituting its "nation-state". 
Within the notion of "captured states," we can speak from the social property, which is privatized by post-war 
"tycoons;" supporting authoritarian rulers linked to kleptocracy as a strategy to maintain stability undermines the 
EU accession process. Civil resistance is not progressive, and all should define life in a democratic society. It is 
an urgent task of building a civic or democratic political culture, which is inconceivable without a built civil 
society. Even the banal level of democracy will not survive for a long time, and more countries are moving towards 
unequivocal authoritarianism and pure illiberalism.  
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Introduction  
The Balkans' concept, metaphors of constant divisions, conflicts, and confusions, traditionally includes the high 
antagonism and wars. The conflicts that took place in Yugoslavia, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina - BiH (1992-
1995), Kosovo (1998-1999), Croatia (1991-1995), the ethnic conflict in Macedonia in 2001 are described as 
intense and long-lasting. It also brought many political, security, social and economic consequences that these 
post-Yugoslav countries, or the countries of the Western Balkans, still face today. The tragic circumstance for all 
Balkan nations and states is that peace, more precisely non-warfare between them, now as in the past, is guaranteed 
only by the great powers. Nevertheless, that kind of guarantee leads to colonial, protector, and occupation "peace." 
These societies structurally destroyed and antagonized1, must be very conflicted so that there is no necessary 
"infrastructure" of a culture of peace and sustainable development. We have had a frequent rise of authoritarians 
and arbitrary recourse to the government; human rights violations and the state have failed to balance the 
relationship between state policy and civil society, which, together with nepotism and corruption, weakens the 
efficiency of state bodies. Western Balkans states are often unable to establish civilian control over security 
systems, much less to restore inappropriate flows of economy and political decision-making, the distribution of 
power by expected, legal, institutional flows. In Southeast Europe, hybrid democracies, kleptocracies, and corrupt 
states have become entrenched today. If we analyze local wars' material side, we see that they are intertwined with 
the global economy. It is particularly noticeable in those areas that were the subject of Jean and Rufin's analysis 
(1996), namely the international embargo, the diaspora, international aid, and organized crime. Moreover, former 
Yugoslavia orders based on ethnic-violence turned into open war economies and entering into dynamic and 
symbiotic relations with illegal global markets and liberal market structures. Within the notion of "captured states," 
we can speak from the social property, which is often privatized by "tycoons" in captured states. The class of 
nationalist capitalists, political-economic oligarchies, during the conflicts, took control of the state apparatus and 
 
1 See: the Berlin daily Der Tagesspiegel published an extensive article entitled 'What is the situation in the Balkan 
countries today?', In which it also deals with Croatia. Paunović P. https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/nijemci-
skenirali-ex-yu-drzave-25-godina-nakon-pocetka-rata-u-bih-gdje-je-tu-hrvatska-20170403 4.4.(2017) 
 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




ownership of economic resources, constituting "nation-states"; unilateral expropriation presenting as a self-
legitimizing act. The presence of capitalism as the ruling model requires the presence of some form of nationalism 
and national identity- where a certain capitalist elite pragmatically chooses to build a nation-state, to effectively 
mobilize and homogenize the rest of society on its platform. Local orders based on ethnic-violence turned into 
open war economies and entering into dynamic and symbiotic relations with illegal global markets and liberal 
market structures. Within the notion of "captured states," we can speak from the social property, which is often 
privatized by post-war "tycoons" in captured states, and taking active funds is possible due to legal omissions in 
the process of transition. Thus, the well-known phrase bribery and corruption, which is an integral part of the 
Balkan reality, has paradoxically become an appropriate mythological image that delegitimizes the Balkan 
disordered or post-communist corrupt transitional collectivity. (Vujić, 2019) In general, only those who have 
funds, de facto, and not only formal or institutional influence, weapons, de facto power, only these actors can 
"deliver results," and in former Yugoslavia, such actors are largely criminalized or are very close to a crime. 
Several examples illustrate the above. Simultaneously, unstable societies, including the societies of the former 
socialist countries of Central and Southeast Europe, are mainly marked by discussions about the political structure 
and political processes. In the former Yugoslavia, in addition to the apparent problems of inequality, corruption, 
and fear politics faced by societies, in terms of the development of participation political culture, there are also 
historical narratives that affect the development of voter awareness of processes within the country that are critical. 
 
Schmitt's (1923) theory of the crisis of representative democracy seems very modern even now. Namely, according 
to him, a political decision cannot be reached by discussion, a critical means of representative bodies, and it is 
realistic to expect paralysis in representative bodies, although not necessarily polarization. In addition to the 
general modalities and the reasons for the state's weakness, another phenomenon can be singled out - selectively 
weak. It is weak only in specific segments. That is, the political elite, balancing between the pressures of the 
international community and the pressures of the public, seeks to weaken the state's functions in segments that are 
not important for the survival of the regime, while late action is expressed comes to government interests. 
(Deudney, 2004) In addition to the marginalization of legislation, there is pressure on the judiciary, which the 
ruling party seeks to subordinate to its own needs - bribery, co-optation, and various forms of persecution.  
 
In the Balkans, democracy is just another means to an end, but it is not an end. Many of the symptoms of the crisis 
that European democracies are currently experiencing have been developing, expressing and consolidating for 
years in the southeast of the continent: the crisis of democracy in Southeast Europe is visible to everyone, and "the 
idea of the liberal-democratic consensus no longer exists" (Bieber, 2017). At the same time, this crisis is not the 
result of acute depression but developed during a long malicious process. 
 
A specific (extremely negative) characteristic of the post-Yugoslav space is that religions are identified with 
nations (majority). Fear of losing identity within multi-national communities, such as Yugoslavia, after 
disintegration led to the sudden "emergence" of antagonistic individual national identities, becoming indivisible 
and exclusive. Criminal actors' circular actions and the conditions of new international actors are often attributed 
to mere ethnic theories that are applied continuously in the Balkans analysis. The most critical question is how all 
the ruling systems that have emerged on the scene are in their essence of ethnopolitics. The answer to that question 
lies in the constitutive role of war for every policy. (Bhabha,1990:128)  
 
M. Hein and A. Frustorfer (2016) analyzed several statistics and indicators that measure democracy according to 
different parameters: developmental, social, and the rule of law. All the countries of Southeast Europe, except for 
Kosovo, regardless of whether they are members of the EU or not, have recorded a constant downward trend over 
the past ten years. It concerns a physical deterioration. However, even in the case of subjective parameters, such 
as citizens' trust in society's parliaments and institutions, the same tendency is shown among the countries of the 
region that are not yet members of the EU or, as in Croatia, which is only members for a short time, the crisis of 
democracy is accompanied by a more moral crisis of values orientation. Moreover, in this confusion, strong leaders 
often provide vital support with simple messages derived from national history. Furthermore, nationalism unites 
communities under the leadership of, admittedly, democratically elected, but leaders who act autocratically.  
 
Political structures in the region are left or right-wing, sometimes opposing each other, and sometimes cooperating 
in networked mutual support systems. However, very often, abuse by the government destroys the essence of 
democracy. The dominant mantra, which is repeated continuously in the region's politics, is "Europe-
Europeanization," and the moral content of "European-Europeanization" is primarily pushed into the background 
vaguely present, or completely lost. As long as we act in the name of "Europeanization" and "democratization," 
anything is possible. All of the above is contained in the fact that international support is given to "political 
pragmatists" who oppose "rigid legalists" throughout the Balkans, and pragmatism is in the process of political 
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and social transformation of society. Meanwhile, states in the region have become "trapped" or "kidnapped" by 
private interests after controversial privatizations and the considerable influence of illegally enriched individuals. 
(Teokarević,2009) 
 
At the same time, the selection of "undemocratic" states is best illustrated by selected twelve indicators of the 
Peace Fund, which cover a wide range of risk factors for state failure - demographic imbalance, social discontent, 
unequal development, economic crisis, the delegitimization of power, widespread corruption, and criminal 
behavior, the inability to collect taxes and attract the support of citizens, as well as environmental degradation and 
brain drain. Nationalist ideologies and identity politics affect socioeconomic stalemate; economic migrations from 
the former Yugoslavia are among Europe's highest. (Eurostat,2017) 
 
1. Defective democracies or Autocracies  
Authoritarianism is versus liberalism. Authoritarian gender means a gap towards political democracy, acceptance 
of hierarchy (including an undemocratic order based on the national leader's authority, for example), belief in a 
healthy state that is the guarantor of solving political and economic problems with national exclusivity. Liberalism 
is the opposite, accepting the principles of the liberal economic order of private property, markets, economic and 
political freedom, and non-acceptance of authoritarian and nationalist ideologies. Over half of all the new electoral 
democracies represent specific variants of diminished sub-types of democracy, which can be called defective 
democracies — starting from the root concept of embedded democracies, which consists of five interdependent 
partial regimes (electoral regime, political rights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, sufficient power to 
govern). We can problematize that there has been a change in value orientations in this area, by accepting or 
rejecting groups of attitudes relating to a particular sphere of social action. These are the economic and political 
organization of society, where different views, value dimensions of economic-political liberalism (rejection or 
acceptance of the basic principles of liberal society - private property, market, multi-party democracy). One of 
them is political authoritarianism, which we assume is the opposite of economic-political liberalism and is based 
on opposition to individual freedoms and statism—the glorification of the state's role. Then there is national 
exclusivism, which is based on the idea that nations should be separated. that members of different nations cannot 
live together. (This is just one dimension of the much broader notion of nationalism). In a broader socio-political 
sense, nationalisms became the leading proponents of the ideology of exclusion, "very quickly became allies in 
the former Yugoslavia," (Papić,2012), which further weakened and impoverished all others did not support such 
discourses. In addition to the apparent problems of inequality, corruption, and fear politics faced by societies, in 
terms of the development of participation political culture, there are also historical narratives that affect the 
development of voter awareness of critical processes within the country. A fundamental characteristic of civil 
society from the socialist-communist period is that it was functional in resolving specific common issues and 
served as a means of political control. Gabriel Almond (1977), hinting at Eastern Europe's upcoming political and 
social processes, warned long ago that the main problem would be an inappropriate political culture. It was later 
confirmed in the research1 conducted by the European Institute of Sussex in countries about to join the EU.  
 
Institutional capacity is "the ability to formulate and implement policies and make laws; to be managed 
successfully with a minimum of bureaucracy; to control blackmail, corruption, and bribery; to maintain a high 
level of publicity and accountability of state institutions; and most importantly, that the laws are enforced. 
(Fukujama, 2004: 20) Countries are becoming constantly dependent on external factors, as weak, unfinished, and 
undemocratic state formations that cannot achieve sufficiently autonomous - economic, political, social, national, 
and security capacities for progress. This claim is supported by the fact that most former Yugoslav states have not 
reached the development level since the late 1980s, with an increased risk of losing capital in interaction with other 
countries. Most countries depend on stand-by arrangements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and some 
have an Extended Fund Facility (EFF), which varies over an extended repayment period. Societies are also heavily 
burdened by the legacy of armed conflict and protracted transitions. Political structures in the region are left or 
right-wing, sometimes opposing each other, and sometimes cooperating in networked mutual support systems. 
However, very often, abuse by the government destroys the essence of democracy. The dominant mantra, which 
is constantly repeated in the region's politics, is "Europe-Europeanization," and the moral content of "European-
 
1 The research was conducted in 10 countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia). Experts studied political institutions' position 
and their functioning in countries that, after the fall of socialism, showed a clear political will for democratization 
and integration into the European Union, in the period from 1989 to 2000. today they are all members of the 
European Union. European Commission, 25 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, The state of integration of East 
and West in the European Union, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation Inclusive, Innovative and 
Refective 
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Europeanization" is mostly pushed into the background vaguely present, or wholly lost. All of the above is 
contained in the fact that international support is given to "political pragmatists, "and pragmatism is in society's 
political and social transformation.  
 
Initially, they can be defined as a kind of hybrid regime, such as competitive authoritarianism, characterized by 
low horizontal accountability, robust, plebiscitary, and prone to executive power abuses. The main feature of this 
regime is that formally there are democratic institutions, but very often, there are abuses by the government, which 
destroys the very essence of democracy. (Lewitsky, Way,2002:53) Democratic institutions are pragmatically-
politically viewed as a means of gaining and exercising political authority. Those in power very often and, to such 
an extent, violate formal rules that the regime does not meet even the usual minimum standards for democracy. 
The elections, while supposed to be free and fair, are, in fact, a "one-horse race" - they deprive the opposition of a 
chance to win, as the authorities regularly misuse state funds and prevent the opposition from gaining media space. 
In this context, the election winners acted as if they had received majority support within the pluralistic competition 
and plebiscitary (Vrcan,1999) support that legitimized them as complete masters of political communities. 
According to Guillermo O'Donnell (1994), a form of regime close to competitive authoritarianism is "delegate 
democracy".  
 
In such states, there are signs of competition between stabilizing and modernizing movements, collectively referred 
to as "development" or "progressive power", and destructive, criminalizing tendencies. However, it is often 
forgotten that both types of tendencies have internal, essential interests that guide them towards cooperation. The 
least controversial and most straightforward point of contact between these seemingly opposing social tendencies 
is focused on the possibility of concretely achieving the goals they have made public as their commitments. For 
example, progressive political forces must prove that they are achieving specific goals: they are "delivering results" 
because of their international partners and local support. In that endeavor, they face many obstacles. Namely, they 
encounter social and even state structures, in which the factual knowledge and means for achieving the results that 
they proclaimed as their lie in the hands of people who are not members of these progressive forces themselves. 
For example, in the police and state security services, the expertise and resources for its use are often in the hands 
of people who are not in the same political "basket" as the democratizing and "progressive" forces in society. The 
situation is similar in other areas where there are legitimate social goals.  
 
In a symbolic sense, this region may be burdened with a negative ontology that is very difficult to change. (Hadžić, 
2020) The nationalization of states prepared the ground for the entry of capitalism - ethnonationalism and 
ethnoreligious violence played a crucial role as a foundation for criminalization. After controversial privatizations 
of former Yugoslav economic giants and banks, and the significant influence of the new actors, countries in the 
region became "captured" by private interests by confiscation of the cultural property of the former Yugoslavia 
and transfer of that property to the thin layer of war profiteers, the former technocratic layer, the domestic political 
elite and foreign tycoons." (Tabaković,2007) The author suggests that the primary determinant of the captured 
state is corruption and a dysfunctional government that cannot implement the reforms necessary for its functioning. 
In terms of crime, at the highest levels of politics leads to the capture of institutions- "captured state". According 
to R. Karklins (2007), it is reflected in the takeover of the entire state by cartels consisting of political elites and 
economic oligarchs. They are captured and made politically expedient, but not socially influential, by legislative, 
executive, judicial instances, and regulatory agencies and prosecuting authorities, which, depending on the 
political interest, abuse the principle of prosecution opportunism." (Stojiljković in Zgodić 2015: 134). The 
European Commission, which usually uses diplomatic language, also stated in 2019. report that the Western 
Balkans countries show clear elements of state capture, including links to organized crime and corruption at all 
levels of government and administration and a strong intertwining of public and private interests. Montenegro and 
Serbia are in accession negotiations with the EU. In 2020, it was agreed to start negotiations with Northern 
Macedonia and Albania. BiH has applied for membership, and Serbia is blocking any progress by Kosovo. It is 
one side of the EU's enlargement process. However, how are things with the values advocated: democracy, the 
rule of law, and sustainable development in practice? The assessment of these countries by the Freedom House 
organization from 2018, Serbia as a semi-consolidated democracy, BiH, Kosovo, and Macedonia as transitional, 
hybrid regimes; regimes that have elements of democracy but also authoritarianism, speaks enough about the fact 
that these countries face fundamental problems, which diminishes their political, social, and economic 
opportunities in the modern world. The characteristics listed for this area have significantly influenced the 
assessment of these countries as weak and that issues such as the status of the country itself have dominated in 
recent years in the operation of this region to other important priorities such as economic underdevelopment Euro-
Atlantic orientation. Furthermore, in a study by the Bertelsmann Foundation1, experts claim that democracy in 
 
1 https://www.dw.com/sr/defektna-demokratija-na-zapadnom-balkanu/a-17384219 Experts from the Bertelsmann 
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Southeast Europe is "defective", that governments are abusing their power, and that citizens' dissatisfaction is 
growing. Dissatisfaction and frustration with government institutions' work are growing in many countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. We can problematize that this can be closely related to the EU crisis, caused by the 
global market and financial crisis. At the same time, EU membership has not yet brought prosperity or a faster 
economic recovery to the region's citizens.1 
 
Ethno-political conflicts hinder political and economic transformation in Bosnia and Kosovo, although Belgrade 
and Pristina are still in dialogue, and an agreement has been signed on the integration of Kosovo-Serb structures 
into Kosovo's institutions. The Freedom House 2018 report stated that some indicators such as national democratic 
governance, the electoral process, civil society, and media independence have deteriorated since 2014. The reasons 
are precisely in the authoritarian political leadership and the dominance of one political option—the lack of 
alternatives in society that will improve the country's situation. Interestingly, many refer to the reforms that should 
come with the attempt to join the EU because it is already known that with such a democratic assessment, many 
current politicians need to change and include in reforms, not just the attitude towards Kosovo or good relations 
with neighbors, but also cooperation with The Hague tribunal (ICTY). In Serbia, political life generally takes place 
outside the game's formal rules, such as the constitution and laws, except when it comes to elections and the 
fundamental freedoms of citizens. The rule of law does not reside here, and informal institutions, such as 
clientelism and corruption, dominate. The executive dominates all political life aspects, ignores the constitution 
and laws, and plays with the legislature and the judiciary and newly established regulatory agencies. Naturally, 
this situation produces political instability, slows down economic development, and negatively affects the long-
term prospects of democracy in the country. (Vladisavljević, 2011: 204) The problems that cause stagnation in 
democratic capacities and political pluralism stem from the nationalism that is retained in the ruling political 
parties, based on the political programs of the parties in Serbia. Another problem is the authoritarian political 
order, driven by nationalism. The leadership type of parties prevails on the political scene, where party leaders and 
their word are undeniable. Furthermore, the use of violence within Serbia, which presumably included the 
assassinations of political opponents and independent journalists, calls into question the regime's classification as 
a defective democracy and suggests an "authoritarian" mode. (Antonić,2002) Simultaneously, the war social 
environment is not a favorable ground for democratic political culture, because even today, Serbia is facing the 
consequences of the war and the past that determines it in many segments. The low level of general culture and 
political culture dominates the party system and public opinion in this country of the Western Balkans, especially 
when it comes to parties in power and opposition. In Serbia, we notice growing pressure on the media, and freedom 
of expression, increasing pressure on power division. Here we have an executive that practically completely 
dominates the legislative processes. Nevertheless, we still cannot define Serbia as an autocracy but as a defective 
democracy (Donner, 2020). It stems from the fact that the president "on several occasions" influenced decision-
making and thus "undermined the state-legal order and the system of separation of powers.2 Approaching NATO 
is treated as a taboo subject due to Serbia's 1999 bombing to stop the conflict in Kosovo. This relationship is also 
reflected in BiH politics. There is also a declarative commitment to European integration, which is burdened by 
the Kosovo syndrome. By the Kosovo syndrome, we mean Serbian politics' burden with the belief that joining the 
EU means renouncing territorial sovereignty. In this way, the EU's demands for better functioning of BiH are read 
in the RS. In the relations between BiH and Kosovo, no aspect can be singled out to function at a satisfactory level. 
Relations remain in the realm of political rhetoric3, and the problem of freedom of movement between BiH and 
Kosovo is directly linked to the problem of asymmetric and scarce economic cooperation. 
 
Foundation analyzed 129 developing and transition countries. The study was conducted based on standardized 
questions, such as: on the possibility of free choice, on the degree of freedom of expression or respect for human 
rights. Also, under scrutiny were social protection systems, economic success, and the fight against corruption. 
Finally, the results were evaluated and presented by a country's position under the headings: democracy, a market 
economy, and quality of government. 
1 That is why European optimism and those political forces that accumulate citizens' dissatisfaction and populist 
mood are strengthening. "This can be especially seen in the example of Bulgaria and Romania, which joined the 
EU in 2007. 
2  2020, https://www.frontslobode.ba/vijesti/politika/151197/zemlje-zapadnog-balkana-imaju-defektne-
demokracije-samo-je-u-bih-demokracija-izrazito-defektna 
3 In RS, Prime Minister Milorad Dodik has threatened to secede from BiH if Kosovo becomes independent. On 
February 20, 2008, the president of the non-governmental organization Serbian People's Movement (SNP), "The 
Choice was Ours," Dane Camkovic, called on Prime Minister Dodik to organize the adoption of a declaration on 
the declaration of independence of RS.  Hina, https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/svijet/banja-luka-poziv-dodiku-da-
proglasi-neovisnost-rs.html,2008 
 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




In the EU, politics lean too strongly on differences, whether they are religious, linguistic, ethnic, or cultural. 
However, due to the growing economic insecurity and the fear of losing national identities in an environment of 
globalized culture, some have perceived multiculturalism as a threat, particularly during the current Migrant crisis. 
(Hadžić,2020)  
 
What about policies in the Balkans? Another has replaced one ideology of collectivity; the ideology of nationalism 
has replaced the ideology of socialism. The basis of such a collectivist pattern is identifying cultural-ethnic and 
institutional-political identity in which the political community is thoroughly identified with the national or ethnic 
community. By instrumentalizing the issue of ethnic/national/confessional within the radicalization of political 
discourse, ethnic homogenization occurs.  The result is that ethnopolitical parties remain in power. Ethnic 
mobilization encourages and spreads a sense of homogeneity and equality and creates a sense of security and 
power in the collective "We." Therefore, the whole process of ethnic mobilization ends with the imposition of a 
kind of pre-political equalization of the people and their political elite, which is now expected to lead them through 
the difficulties of the hostile transitional environment within the highly homogenized former Yugoslav political 
space. (Hadžić,2020:25) 
 
Thus, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the ruling elites' prominent role, of course, and gaining and 
consolidating power, was to build a national identity but accompanied by great violence based on the most terrible, 
most aggressive expression of the re-emergence of ethnicity. "Heart" of politics. Friend-enemy is the ultimate 
degree of intensity of grouping and separation. The author argues that the highlights of the "big state "hegemony 
Balkan politics are also the moments in which the enemy sees the enemy in real clarity. From the example of the 
post-Yugoslav space, one could learn a lesson about internal discord and destruction ideologies as inconvenient 
historical facts in this area: fear of the other (minority/majority discourse) is the greatest enemy human social 
communities. (Hadžić, 2020: 812) It is known that the social positions of religion and religious communities are 
more influential if they help determine identity. The stronger their influence on the creation of identity, the higher 
their influence on political life. Simultaneously, it has proved true that ethnic divisions are more difficult to 
overcome than religious, social, or cultural divisions within a nation. (Kasapović,2007:141) As in BiH, political 
polarization is carried out on a confessional/national basis: Muslims gave support to candidates from the Bosniak 
people, Catholics to those from the Croat people, and Orthodox candidates from the Serb people. It is a permanent 
crisis state, the inability to create the minimum internal political cohesion needed to build a stable political identity. 
Within the discourse of defective democracy with the nationalist legitimacy of BiH, it was a special case, because 
in it in a single formal state framework, they faced three virtual communities, represented by the respective parties, 
each of which not only claimed the role of the only legitimate representative of the respective ethnonational group 
but also confirmed that role in free elections. (Pešić,2002) In the BiH's ethnoreligious model, which is formed by 
agreement of the three constituent peoples, the demographic remnant is unconstitutional. For the most part, a mere 
constitutional decor appropriately enshrined in the last indent of the Preamble of the discriminatory BiH 
Constitution. Therefore, the name "Others" is an unsentimental description of their position in this ethnoreligious 
divided society. 
 
Furthermore, collective interests dominate citizens' individual preferences in the example of BiH, preventing the 
development of free debate and the inclusion of non-ethnic elements of society. Besides, on the example of BiH, 
institutions' strength in terms of the rule of law and good governance was assessed as inferior, with deteriorations 
noted. This situation's reasons are inconsistent laws, ineffective coordination within institutions and between 
different government levels, the fragmentation of institutional structures, and the absence of a supreme judicial 
body. The complexity of the political and legal system in BiH society is also evident through four separate judicial 
systems, the state, two Entities, and Brčko District, as an independent territory, while ten cantons in FBiH1 also 
have their judicial systems. Another issue, expressed in terms of the rule of law and enforceable in practice, is the 
political influence on the judiciary and its inability to act independently. In BiH, all three ethnopolitical structures 
pursue containment policies, so "hybrid wars" prevent their necessary transition into three political communities. 
(Hadžić, 2020:250)   
 
The study argues that Kosovo has the attribute of a proto-state, in the transformation process, as a state that was 
part of Serbian statehood and based on its unresolved status. Kosovo's transformation process depends not only on 
its capabilities but also on its neighbors and the international community and its efforts. Kosovo's problems are 
similar to those of all Western Balkan countries, all the more critical because of its specific issue. Non-recognition 
of his independence and strained relations with Serbia limit his progress. Democracy in Kosovo is at a standstill, 
 
1 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (Another entity is the Republic of Srpska and one district-Brčko District) 
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with government weaknesses best reflected in the inability to overcome internal tensions. National party elites 
dominate the political scene; there are sharp attitudes of the government and the opposition with a minimal role of 
non-members in party affairs, a limited direct role of party members in decision making, lack of party factions, 
weak influence within groups by functional groups like women, youth and retirees, lack of affiliated organizations, 
hierarchical internal order, simple organizational patterns. The parties are institutionalized but do not have a broad 
membership. Historical and political circumstances, primarily war events, have contributed to the Balkans, 
including Croatia, being defined as a "derailed transition," where the nation-state's formation took precedence over 
democratic change and the problematic legacy of communism and economic backwardness. M. Kasapović states 
that the war made the transition processes in the country second-rate because the formation and defense of the 
newly formed state gained a clear advantage over the transformation of political and social life and that Croatia 
often moved from transitional to war studies, where war not only significantly surpassed transition processes, 
rather than making them opaque. (Kasapović, 2001: 16) The judiciary was subjected to an officially unrecognized 
purge carried out according to the criteria of political obedience and ethnic (Serbian) affiliation. (Uzelac,2001:4) 
According to the political system's characteristics, it is not an authoritarian regime, but according to the policy 
pursued in that defective democracy, it is very close. The economic situation has only partially improved, thanks 
to EU funds, in Croatia. However, in the long run, the system has caused the most massive exodus of the 
population, reducing the tax base and jeopardizing pension health systems. A recent survey (2018) in Croatia 
shows that the main reasons for mass emigration are "an unorganized and corrupt state." (Jurić,2018) 
 
Slovenia, the first former Yugoslav EU member, since 2004, does not have a high level of corruption, widespread 
clientelism, partisanship, lack of strategic vision, and is evenly developed. Although the former Slovenian Prime 
Minister was convicted of corruption, Slovenia has a perception of corruption of over 60%, while Croatia, to 48%. 
 
A quarter of a century after the break-up of Yugoslavia, the rest of Europe was warned that there was a political 
and economic vacuum in Western Balkans, which could soon turn into a security-political problem. That is why 
Austria is firmly in favor of giving these countries a critical perspective of EU membership. Compared to a few 
years ago, EU membership today is less attractive to some Western Balkans countries, some of which are starting 
to turn their heads towards new partners, such as Russia. Countries such as BiH and North Macedonia, which rely 
on Russia for oil and gas, are particularly sensitive to Russian incitement to anti-Western and nationalist narratives. 
 
2. Kleptocracies  
The critique of aristocratic and bourgeois kleptocracy, initiated by Rousseau's initial thesis full of foreboding, was 
taken over by the French Revolution; it took over her with a bitter enthusiasm from which arose the perilous 
connection of idealism and resentment. Already with the early socialists, almost expressis verbis meant: the 
property is theft. Young Marx was at first very sympathetic to the anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who coined 
this infamous phrase and demanded, in the 1840 title deed, the abolition of the old order and the establishment of 
unions of producers in which there would be no administration. The only power that could oppose the plunder of 
the future would have to rest on one new socio-psychological invention of "society." That finding would be nothing 
less than a revolution of the hand he gives. (Sloterdijk, 2010) The fact is that after the Second World War, socialist 
Yugoslavia became a kind of European success story. Between 1960-1980, it had one of the highest economic 
growth rates in the world, a decent standard of living, free medical care and education, a guaranteed right to work, 
one of the most respected passports, one-month paid vacation, a literacy rate of over 90 percent, and a life 
expectancy of 73 years. In terms of living standards and freedoms ahead of most Eastern European countries and 
individual branches of the economy ahead of Western European countries. After Tito's death, the biggest problem 
was that civil democracies did not replace communism, but ethnonational ones. The period characterized as 
transitional after the wars in the former Yugoslavia should be analyzed as a period in which capitalism is already 
there, being established by the abolition of social property, workers' self-government, and the withdrawal of the 
state from the position of equal economic actor. Apart from the interests of international financial institutions, 
there was another interest, and that was the interest of those who implemented the required measures and created 
economic policy. The class of nationalist capitalists, political-economic oligarchies, during the conflicts, took 
control of the state apparatus and ownership of economic resources, constituting "nation-states"; unilateral 
expropriation presenting as a self-legitimizing act. The presence of capitalism as the ruling model requires the 
presence of some form of nationalism and national identity- where a certain capitalist elite pragmatically chooses 
to build a nation-state, to effectively mobilize and homogenize the rest of society on its platform. Local orders 
based on ethnic-violence turned into open war economies and entering into dynamic and symbiotic relations with 
illegal global markets and liberal market structures. Thus, domestic monetary policy was, in fact, between the 
pressure of capital and the interests of political structures. As we know, one of the consequences of this situation 
was corruption. When we look at countries in transition, it is clear that it is a structural phenomenon. In the case 
of introducing a capitalist economy of the most liberal type with intense competition, the group of individuals who 
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carried out the liberalization itself had a favorable position to facilitate the entry of large capital and make money 
at the same time. Given the poor prospects of the domestic economy and foreign players' strength, this proved to 
be the most rational way to acquire start-up capital with which these politicians could start their economic activity 
or at least provide themselves existentially. A massive level of corruption developed during this period. In this 
sense, the comprador bourgeoisie's corruption proves to be a structural phenomenon in peripheral economies. 
 
If we analyze local wars' material side, we see that they are intertwined with the global economy. It is particularly 
noticeable in those areas that were the subject of Jean and Rufin's analysis1, namely the international embargo, the 
diaspora, international aid, and organized crime. Moreover, the former Yugoslavia orders based on ethnic-violence 
turned into open war economies and entering into dynamic and symbiotic relations with illegal global markets and 
liberal market structures. Within the already mentioned notion of "captured states," we can speak from the social 
property, which is often privatized by post-war "tycoons" in captured states. Taking active funds is possible due 
to legal omissions in the process of transition. Pavlović calls this type of devastation of the country "tunneling of 
resources from companies" (Pavlović, 2006) where companies are devastated on the transfer of assets and profits 
in favor of the majority ownership that is already owned by a private company. The very transformation of all 
states, in most cases, depends on the social strata and actors of power within states. Such is the case in this type of 
government as well. Most often, society's strata have no interest in carrying out reforms and supporting political 
and economic transformation. Political and economic change cannot be fully accomplished due to disagreements 
between the economic and political spheres that would thwart the functioning of democratic institutions, because 
the consolidation of the democratic order and the establishment of a market economy are in the balance of 
incompleteness. 
 
Furthermore, the economic approach is not limited to explaining the behavior of those who have power and who 
are only interested in satisfying their interests (Lock 2002: 268) and indicates that when applied from a theoretical 
perspective, the system that civil wars are processes with their dynamics. Simultaneously, the critical moment is 
the ambiguity of the circumstances related to the relationship between the state and the war. This ambiguity cannot 
be removed, and it will be enough to look at, say, the situation in Serbia in the 1990s: the state becomes an 
instrument of ruling elites, there is a union of form and regime and constant interference of administration and 
state, expanded clientelism, Caesarist codes of government, financial oligarchy. It increasingly announces 
dissatisfaction at the end of the millennium) and the deterioration of the social fabric. Illegal economy, structural 
adjustment policies conditioned by international financial funds, the reputation of the endeavor market, long-term 
transition, high unemployment rate, government impregnations with organized crime, socio-political exclusions 
are factors shaping the socioeconomic climate of the region - the complex political, social, and economic realities 
and changing expectations (security and stability of states) prolonged the aspirations of individual countries for 
the process of democratization and integration into the EU and NATO. The result is processes characterized by a 
lack of transformation, cooperation, security, and general disorganization at the regional and international levels. 
It created attempts to isolate the Western Balkans from the rest of the political, economic, and even "geographical" 
Europe as a particular entity that generates only violence and instability. The long-term absence of a political will 
manifested itself through institutional vacuums after ethnoreligious conflicts, created a strategic basis for 
developing a fragile state of security and the criminalization of societies. (Hadžić,2020:259) On the example of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina's post-war situation, M. Pugh showed how strongly political and economic interests are 
intertwined with controlling over trade and production. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also an excellent example of 
how the international embargo has enabled the creation of many monopoly positions based on force and how, 
partly because of these monopolies, war's economic structures greatly hinder the construction of a market order in 
the postwar period. (Pugh 2002). 
 
A. Peter argued that war economies in places like the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia are criminalized 
because they rely on criminal actors and the black market as the primary source of funding and supply, within a 
close connection between conflict and crime, which gives these conflicts the form of criminalized conflicts. An 
important economic feature of the war in the former Yugoslavia is the explosion of so-called war profiteers. Since 
every war is, by definition, a time of abnormal tendencies in all spheres of human life, the most drastic changes in 
the domain of economic efficiency have taken place. A unique economic feature and most significant impetus for 
strengthening criminal networks in the Balkans was the tremendous economic opportunity offered by weapons or 
other war goods, such as fuel, and international humanitarian aid appropriation. In this respect, the war economy's 
 
1 A pioneering contribution to the paradigm shift, the transition from ethnicity to the economy, was given by a 
collection that appeared in 1996 under the title "Economie des guerres civiles," edited by Francois Jean and Jean 
Rufin. It analyzes the participants' economic strategies and interests in the war in a series of well-researched cases. 
It shows how both those strategies and those interests are firmly connected with global financial processes. 
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legacy profoundly affected the post-war processes of social reconstruction. The problems arising from the state's 
criminalization arise mainly in environments characterized by institutions' weakness and the moral crisis that 
usually accompanies weak institutions. In the former Yugoslavia political environment, politicians often act 
without moral responsibility, nor after the lawsuits against them and the publicly announced crimes they committed 
as officials. Most democratic forces engaged individuals from dubious criminal status, openly known criminals, 
as their official security, and criminals were often part of political assemblies (Arkan1). There is almost no 
prominent politician in the region who has not been accused of abuse of power. Investigations are mostly not 
completed, and even if there is a trial, it ends with an acquittal. (Hadžić, 2020) While the salaries of 
parliamentarians in EU countries amount to two or three average salaries, this ratio in BiH (the highest paid in ex-
Yu2) is as high as eight average salaries, which puts them among the highest in Europe. The profession of 
"politician" has become a synonym for the best paid social elite, which has the right to "white bread after the 
expiration of its mandate."3 
 
Besides, the constant political, economic, and security crisis have inevitably led to the erosion of institutional 
structures and the creation of informal social relations, often based on nepotism - a kleptocracy. After controversial 
privatizations of former Yugoslavia economic giants and banks, and the significant influence of the new actors, 
countries in the region became "captured" by private interests by confiscation of the cultural property of the former 
Yugoslavia and transfer of that property to the thin layer of war profiteers, the former technocratic layer, the 
domestic political elite and foreign tycoons." (Tabaković,2007) The author suggests that the primary determinant 
of the captured state is corruption and a dysfunctional government that cannot implement the reforms necessary 
for its functioning. In terms of crime, at the highest levels of politics leads to the capture of institutions- "captured 
state." According to R. Karklins (2005), it is reflected in the takeover of the entire state by cartels consisting of 
political elites and economic oligarchs. They are captured and made politically expedient, but not socially 
influential, by legislative, executive, judicial instances, and regulatory agencies and prosecuting authorities, which, 
depending on the political interest, abuse the principle of prosecution opportunism." (Stojiljković, 2015: 134). The 
European Commission, which usually uses diplomatic language, also stated in 2019. report that the countries of 
the Western Balkans show clear elements of state capture, including links to organized crime and corruption at all 
levels of government and administration and a strong intertwining of public and private interests. Moreover, the 
nationalization of states prepared the ground for the entry of capitalism - ethnonationalism and ethnoreligious 
violence played a crucial role, as a foundation for criminalization. Starting from the war accumulation of capital 
(profiteering), through the privatizations of the 1990s, to the formation of power within ethnopolitics (especially 
war parties). During the war in BiH, significant economic capacities were destroyed, and "smugglers became the 
main suppliers on the market." The black economy in all former Yugoslav countries has left visible changes in the 
population's social structure; contributed to the impoverishment of a large part of the population. Economic 
empires of war and post-war actors were created, mainly enriched by the smuggling of excise goods banned from 
trade. The conflict in BiH did not differentiate between political and criminal, and there is an interaction of political 
interests and the interests of the crime itself. (Hadžić,2020) 
 
Within the illegal economy, Montenegro's political elite has suffered numerous accusations from the international 
community of systematic tobacco smuggling, Kosovo and North Macedonia as a profile of hotspots drugs 
smuggling from Afghanistan through Turkey, and Serbia's political elite in 2001-2004 under "pro-European reform 
ruled allegations of supporting Mafia in exchange for their support for "social reforms."4 At the same time, in these 
examples, we see that party elites are willing to tacitly or actively participate in these operations, retaining social 
power despite society's impoverishment. In all of these cases, criminals have played a key role in strengthening 
political leaders in countries undergoing a difficult and, in part, unsuccessful "transition." (Köppel, Szekely,2002) 
The critical problem is the presence of mutual trust between the phenomena of "politicization of crime and 
criminalization of politics." The distribution of power in a critical region characterized by sociopolitical change 
 
1 Serbian commander of a paramilitary force in the Yugoslav Wars, state agent and state assassin, war criminal, 
politician, and president of the Obilić football club. He was on Interpol's most-wanted list in the 1970s -1980s for 
robberies and murders committed in several countries across Europe and was later indicted by the UN for crimes 
against humanity for his role during the wars. He was assassinated in 2000 before his trial could take place. Danas 
- Google Boeken,2009 
2  Vukomanović,2019,T.https://www.direkt-portal.com/politicari-u-bih-najplaceniji-u-evropi-u-odnosu-na-
gradjane/  
3 Presidents, prime ministers, ministers, deputies, advisers, and deputies and heads of state institutions can receive 
a salary by law one year after the end of their term. CIN, Center for Investigative Reporting 
4 These are flagrant examples of synergies between the political elite and organized crime because the police alone 
could never act like this. 
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processes has conditioned the synergy of phenomena, and some transitional effects have become structural. Such 
a historical legacy has persisted to this day and is detrimental to institutional relations and the consolidation of 
democratic institutions. Blocking the transformation did not mean that systemic changes were frozen, but that the 
introduction of a full market economy was delayed for members of the ruling group to make the most of their 
political position economically.1 In Croatia, F. Tuđman2 and the HDZ3 enjoyed (and exploited) a vast space for 
arbitrary rule. Imposing the establishment of Croatian statehood and its secession from Yugoslavia as an almost 
exclusive political topic, the post-communist ruling group gave itself practically free hands to govern all areas of 
social life. The state took over the previous social ownership of companies and began privatization. Although 
neither in terms of available capital nor entrepreneurial skills, its protégés and clients could play neither an 
exclusive nor a significant role (Bišćanić, 2005: 32) the lack of a reliable legal framework, both in privatization 
and in regulating the relationship between state and private companies, leaves broad scope for state influence on 
the economic sphere, including systemic corruption. When this kind of cooperation between political elites and 
criminal organizations is further concretized and developed, this synergy becomes an organized phenomenon of 
state crime in the same way as during Gonzalez's Government in Spain act of organized state crime. 
 
However, how are things today, with the values advocated: democracy, the rule of law, and sustainable 
development in practice? In all Southeast European countries, corruption is still constant and one of the biggest 
opponents of democracy development. Meager turnout in elections in Serbia, Croatia, and Northern Macedonia is 
an expression of deep distrust of democracy. In addition to the marginalization of legislation, there is pressure on 
the judiciary, which the ruling party seeks to subordinate to its needs - bribery, co-optation, and various forms of 
persecution. In general, only those who have "funds, "de facto, not just formal or institutional influence, weapons, 
de facto power, only these actors can "deliver results," and in weak states, such actors are heavily criminalized or 
very close to a crime. Three internal dimensions determine the space and chances for political corruption: the 
existence of privileges that politicians can distribute to small groups, the rich' ability to legally achieve the benefits 
and longevity of these formed economic and political alliances. These three dimensions increase politicians' 
willingness to receive illegal funds for their campaigns, tycoons' mood for corrupt politicians.  
 
For Croatia, the example of the judiciary's weakness in the fight against corruption is the clear example of Zagreb 
Mayor Milan Bandić, who was exposed to "constant accusations of corruption and abuse of office, was arrested 
once but acquitted each time. It is stated, not by chance, that the mayor of Zagreb was elected to the position for 
the sixth time in 2017. Current COVID-19 demonstrations in Belgrade, Serbia, have disrupted a President 
Aleksandar Vučić's ruling party. Northern Macedonia is facing an almost impossible government after an 
"undemocratic "election campaign. Katica Janeva, a former state attorney, has been accused of corruption.4 The 
Prime Minister of Northern Macedonia, since 2006-2016, Nikola Gruevski has been in exile in Budapest following 
a corruption ruling conviction.5 Albania and Kosovo are in constant crisis mode. Kosovo's elected prime minister, 
Albin Kurti, is ousted by US intrigue, and Kosovo President Hashim Thaci6 faces war crimes charges, which 
Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama7 sees as an attack on all Albanians, a psalm dispute over the law on freedom 
of religion between the ultra-reactionary Serbian Orthodox Church and the clique gathered around longtime ruler 
Milo Djukanovic.8 
 
1 It fits in with T. Carothers' warning in Western Civil Society Aid to Eastern Europe and the Former SSSR, 
European Constitutional Review 55/1999, p. 56. Not only is "transition" not a rapid and one-way process; reforms 
are often blocked by the actors, not the losers, but precisely those who are at a particular stage of the gain and who 
are trying to freeze the situation in order to increase their gains. 
2 Following the country's independence from Yugoslavia, he became the first President of Croatia and served as 
president from 1990 until he died in 1999.  
3 HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community) is the prominent conservative, center-right [ political party in Croatia. 
4 June 18, 2020, A court in North Macedonia on Thursday sentenced ex-Special Prosecution chief Katica Janeva 
and showman-turned-businessman Bojan Jovanovski to seven and nine years in prison, respectively, for their roles 
in the so-called "Extortion" case. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/06/18/north-macedonia-jails-ex-special-
prosecutor-over-extortion-case/ 
5 Nezavisen Vesnik,23/05/2018, https://balkaneu.com/gruevski-sentenced-to-2-years-in-prison-in-tank-case/ 
6  Kosovar politician who has been the President of Kosovo[b] since April 2016. He was the first Prime 
Minister of Kosovo and the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister in the new cabinet led by Isa Mustafa, 
who assumed office on December 12, 2014. 
7  Albanian politician, painter, writer, publicist, former pedagogue, and former basketball player,[2] who is 
currently serving as the 33rd[3] Prime Minister of Albania (since September 13, 2013) and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (since January 21, 2019). Rama has also been the chairman of the Socialist Party of Albania since 2005. 
8 Montenegrin politician who has served as the president of Montenegro since May 20, 2018. He served as prime 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 




Serbian-born economist B. Milanovic wrote on his blog about "multi-party kleptocracies"; political scientist J. 
Mujanovic described it in his book "Hunger and Anger" as "elastic authoritarianism"; V. Džihić from the Austrian 
Institute for Foreign Policy noted that the Serbia elections were about "false democracy and the art of 
illusion."(Steinacker, 2020) 
 
However, some EU countries' situation is not progressive; Romania, Bulgaria, Malta, Cyprus, Hungary, and 
Poland. Hungarian sociologist B. Magyar, in 2016, described Hungary as a "post-communist mafia state." This 
particular criterion can be replicated in the "six of the Western Balkans" countries. In Croatia, we have a daily 
discourse of new economic crime affairs, which unfortunately confirms the famous Balkan paradigm of "who 
moaned, moaned."1 The Uljanik case received the expected epilogue to introduce the bankruptcy and destruction 
of a critical segment of the Croatian industry. Namely, the twelve arrested members of the Supervisory Board of 
Uljanik Shipyard, within a well-developed criminal network, succeeded beyond control and state inspection, 
shipyards, and the state budget damage by more than 1.2 billion kunas. Bankruptcy and destruction of Croatian 
shipbuilding and other segments of the industry (steel, metallurgy) (Vujić,2019), in other countries, BiH precisely2 
(energy, water, infrastructure) as strategic segments. 
 
Conclusion  
The Balkans in geographical form through the former Yugoslavia, except Slovenia, has become a frozen entity in 
history due to the prevailing ethnonational differences and circumstances between and within borders (nationalism, 
sovereignty, and identities) opposing democratic peace. As in other countries that have experienced and survived 
the implosion of communist regimes, in post-Yugoslav countries, democracy has not been won by independent 
and robust social groups that can act as a counterweight to the state structure, with formed interests that act 
"transformatively"; not directing political change and form the basis of political pluralism expressed through 
different parties. Ethnonationalism does not bring political scenes a socio-economic system that would already be 
independently formed, with appropriate bearers of transformative interests and competing "projects" of the new 
order. In Yugoslavia, this space was predetermined by a high degree of decentralization on the formal institutional 
level, never achieving social integration and nationalist policy in the institutional constitution of federal units and 
the informal political mobilization of support for rivals directly-post communist rule. Most often, society's strata 
have no interest in carrying out reforms and supporting political and economic transformation.  
 
Political and economic change cannot be fully accomplished due to disagreements between the economic and 
political spheres that would thwart democratic institutions' functioning because of the consolidation of the 
democratic order and the establishment. On the other hand, within the consequences of disagreement and inability 
to make decisions in representative bodies, there may be directly democratic, or street support, to entrust authority 
to one person, or one group or party. Paralysis, therefore, in representative bodies, which the already mentioned 
Schmidt, within the theory, considers an inevitable characteristic of representative democracy, can lead to an 
increased role of authoritarian leaders who directly support the people. In the processes of political and social 
transformation of society, pragmatism is a dangerous thing, and the apparent tendency of key political actors to 
follow the "speech of Europe" in their daily political practice without taking into the content. In contrast, 
understanding Balkan institutions as issues of the foreign power in society is distributed between those who dispose 
of it, those who have the "funds "and ways to protect it, and those who can articulate their political interests, at 
least verbally, in "European" terms. Some of the Balkan nations are still being formed. However, most have not 
yet reached the stage of development at which the nation-state, through internal democratic transformation, 
naturally transforms into a true state of all citizens, equal in everything (although this can be said for many other 
states, including some who see themselves as role models of liberalism).  
 
 
minister of Montenegro in three governments from 1991 to 1998, as the president of Montenegro from 1998 to 
2002, and as prime minister again from 2003 to 2006, from 2008 to 2010, and from 2012 to 2016. Đukanović is 
also the long-term president of the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro, originally the Montenegrin 
branch of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which has governed Montenegro since the introduction 
of multi-party politics. 
1 The phrase 'he who moaned, moaned serves the relationship of the small and the big thief. They praise the big 
one; they take off the hat of the little one. That phrase became common knowledge when Ljubo Ćesić Rojs 
(Croatian politician) uttered it in Parliament. 
2 So far, 106 small hydropower plants have been built in BiH. Moreover, at least another 401 are in various stages 
of planning, preparation, and construction. Isović,M.,2020,https://www.6yka.com/novosti/male-hidroelektrane-u-
bih-sve-sto-nam-vlasti-i-investitori-ne-zele-rec 
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At the intra-social level, in the circumstances of capitalism, in most Balkan societies, there is no visible more 
developed institutionalized social solidarity, and some class compromises if we problematize that "class peace" is 
achieved by coercion of primitive and brutal capital, which imposes unquestioning obedience to wage labor. For 
the most part, the state is on the side of such capital, far from a neutral judge in the objectively existing sharp 
conflicts of interest of "labor" and capital. Today, however, we can see that economic and political elites are more 
willing to accept ecological and social catastrophes than significant capitalist system changes. In the Balkans as a 
whole, we witness the destruction of the public and natural resources (energy, water, infrastructure) and heavy 
industries such as shipyards and steel mills. Although identical neoliberal policies are applied throughout the 
Balkans, they differ in intensity because they depend on local circumstances conditioned by different socialist and 
post-socialist legacies and ethnic-nationalist and religious conflict. The European integration process has been 
used by local political actors to justify further neoliberal reforms. In a neglected problem area, political culture 
occupies a particularly important place, understood as a time-changing set of beliefs, values, knowledge, feelings, 
and attitudes of members of a society towards political objects, processes, and goals for which the actions of 
historical tradition are intertwined, the structure of political institutions and the principles of functioning of the 
political system. So, quite specifically, it is an urgent task of building a civic or democratic political culture, which 
is inconceivable without a built civil society.  
 
No form of rational state was glorified if the authorities allowed themselves everything they could. Often, they, 
not the individual by their arbitrariness in their actions and anathematizing the individual's protection, themselves 
opened the door to anarchy and political upheavals. Sin is on the authorities, not on the individual. The Western 
Balkans continue to face a crisis of representation in which citizens find themselves alienated from public 
institutions, and more importantly, the Balkan states fail to ensure their citizens' rights and security. At the moment, 
there is nothing to suggest that a peripheral area like the Balkans, which is still structurally fragile, does not risk 
instability from the outside - not to mention the tendency to slip into nationalism or severe reversals of a weak 
state as has already happened between the two wars in order to respond accurately to economic difficulties - 
attention to these issues must not be lowered. Therefore, leaving aside only the persuasion of local situations and 
integration efforts, although significant, the worst uncertainty and fragility can slow down the normalization 
process and other unplanned consequences. For plural societies to survive without separatism, it is possible to 
either assimilate minorities or institutionalize conflicts among social segments through consociational democracy. 
It recognizes and respects social segments and divisions between them, striving to establish a stable and functional 
democracy by including plural social segments in the political process. Outvoting smaller segments prevents 
establishing a veto institution where each of the segments has the right to invoke. Thus, concluding more "alliances 
with libertarian and democratic forces" against the growing concentration of media in the hands of political elites 
requires courage, constructiveness, and civilian forms resistance. Nevertheless, there is a possibility to break 
through this negative tendency and consolidating autocratic structures.  
 
The status quo and lack of qualitative changes maintenance political-interest structures, utterly independent of 
differences in their proclaimed political-ideological goals. The confrontation with kleptocracy is a condition of all 
other social changes. The class of nationalist capitalists, political-economic oligarchies, during the conflicts, takes 
control of the state apparatus and ownership of economic resources, constituting "nation-states"; unilateral 
expropriation presented as a self-legitimizing act by which the whole society realizes its being in the form of 
sovereignty and embodies itself by constituting its "nation-state". There are only two possibilities - either 
underlining the line and a definite deviation from kleptocracy, a definite change, of course, further decline, 
affecting population dynamics. Within the notion of "captured states," we can speak from the social property, 
which is privatized by post-war "tycoons;" supporting authoritarian rulers linked to kleptocracy as a strategy to 
maintain stability undermines the EU accession process. It also discredits the values, credibility, image, and acquis 
of the EU. Still, political structures in their current positions have little incentive to change. Moreover, they will 
do more harm than good if they give up clientelism. Paradoxically, politicians who play the nationalist card are 
often complicit in undermining their country's sovereignty from within or endangering the national interest for 
personal gain - often through secret agreements with the "enemy" - or the interests of foreign powers.  
 
Citizens of states that emerged from Yugoslavia's disintegration instead of democracies ended up in hybrid 
democracies and kleptocracies. Although all countries in the region have free voting and multi-party life, citizens 
are not a political factor; the culture of protest and civil resistance not progressive; civil society is underdeveloped, 
and all should define life in a democratic society. Political elites have managed to reduce the democratic experience 
to a somewhat banal level. Thus, it seems that even that banal level of democracy will not survive for a long time 
and that more countries are moving towards unequivocal authoritarianism and pure illiberalism. To change such a 
situation, the collective path, citizens must become a far greater and more important factor of political life in the 
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region and individual states' political life. The influence and "action" of the international centers of power are 
becoming necessary and urgent. 
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